Cambridge / MIT workshop on Decision Theory, etc.

Nozick's 1970 statement of Newcomb's problem inaugurated a dispute in the foundations of decision theory that at present shows no sign of resolution. The basic question is over the role of causal information in decision-making. Perhaps agents *must* possess such information in practical settings, in which case only a *Causal* Decision Theory can appropriately formalize practical reasoning. Or perhaps they need only possess whatever statistical and other non-causal information guides the predictions and retrodictions of disinterested spectators--in which case an *Evidential* theory is sufficient. Or perhaps the conflict is itself illusory: maybe causation itself is a form of evidential connection that is only visible from the agential perspective. This workshop presents recent and in-progress work on these issues.

Program

12pm-1.10pm: Caspar Hare / Brian Hedden (MIT): Self-Reinforcing and Self-Undermining Decisions

1.10-2 Lunch: (own arrangements)

2-3.10: Arif Ahmed (Cambridge): Deliberation and myopia

3.15-4.25: Richard Holton / Caspar Hare (MIT): Determinism, Sloth and the Opacity of the Future

4.25-4.50: Tea

4.50-6pm: Huw Price (Cambridge / Sydney): Retrocausality -- What would it take?


Registration is free but if you are interested please email Arif Ahmed at [email protected] to give us an idea of numbers.